To guarantee security and privacy in image transmission and archival applications, adequate efficient bulk encryption techniques are necessary which are able to cope with the vast amounts of image data involved. Experience has shown that block-oriented symmetric product ciphers constitute an adequate design paradigm for resolving this task, since they can offer a very high level of security as well as very high encryption rates.
INTRODUCTION
To guarantee security and privacy in image transmission and archival applications, adequate efficient encryption techniques are necessary which can cope with the vast amounts of image data involved. Cryptologic experience has shown that block-oriented symmetric product ciphers constitute an adequate design paradigm for resolving this task. Therefore, since the cryptographic concept is well developed and possible cryptanalytic attacks have been studied in detail, we adopt the general framework of an iterated product cipher when developing a novel method for efficient image encryption applications.
Symmetric product ciphers
Symmetric product ciphers (DES,23 IDEA,2° SKIPJACK (Clipper),9"5 FEAL36 etc.) which perform a blockwise encryption of the plaintext input to the system currently offer unparalleled advantages for bulk encryption applications. They are much faster then public-key systems (RSA, 29 ElGamal, and offer a higher degree of security than simple substitution or permutation systems (see e.g.34'37"6) do. Figure 1 gives the general scheme for implementing a product cipher. Input to the system is a block of plaintext Po and a user-supplied pass-phrase. From this key the internal key management derives the individual keys K (1 i r) and supplies them to the various encryption rounds. Every round i applies one permutation (rearrange input symbols based on symbol position) and one substitution (replace input symbols based on symbol value) operation to Pi (keyed by Kp and Ks, respectively) and thus computes the ciphertext block C2. After executing r rounds, C,. gives the ciphertext output by the r-round product cipher.
Important properties
A single round of an iterated cipher usually involves only simple operations which would be quite easy to break by themselves. It is the repeated intertwined application of permutation and substitution steps that accounts for the cryptanalytic strength of the overall system. Provided that certain requirements are met, product ciphers are computationally secure which implies that it is extraordinary unlikely for an intruder to break the system in the foreseeable future. Of course there are many conditions required for a secure cipher, but the following ones are fundamental and probably most important in applications dealing with image data encryption:
Confusion: Ensures that the (statistical) properties of plaintext blocks are not reflected in the corresponding ciphertext blocks. Instead every ciphertext has to have a pseudo-random appearance to any observer or standard statistical test.
Diffusion:
. In terms of plaintexts: Demands that (statistically) similar plaintexts do result in completely different ciphertexts even when encrypted with the same key. In particular this requires that any element of the input block influences every element of the output block in a complex irregular fashion. . In terms of pass-phrases: Demands that similar pass-phrases do result in completely different ciphertexts even when used for encrypting the same block of plaintext. This requires that any element of the pass-phrase influences every element of the output block in a complex irregular fashion. Additionally this property must also be valid for the decryption process because otherwise an intruder might recover parts of the input block from an observed output by a partly correct guess of the pass-phrase used for encryption.
New concepts introduced in this contribution
Essentially, iterated product ciphers constitute a common basis for almost all contemporary bulk encryption systems (DES, IDEA and also Clipper). However, the security of these systems seems to reside mainly in the substitution parts which depend upon the key in a very complex manner. The permutation operations, on the other hand, do possess a fixed dynamics that is usually not influenced by the key. Instead, they just rearrange the elements of the input block in a predefined way specified, once and for all, by the designer of the cipher system.
In our perspective this is clearly a weakness which also accounts for the problem that certain iterated ciphers are particularly susceptible to a powerfull new attack called differential cryptanalysis3'4'2' . A main goal of this contribution is, therefore, to improve on this situation and propose a novel approach how key-dependent permutations can be integrated into the general concept of a product cipher.
Additionally, while all of the current product ciphers operate on small data blocks, our approach involves permutations and substitutions on whole images. This concept offers several advantages:
. Methods operating on small data blocks are not suitable for image encryption when run in a mode where each block is encrypted independently from other blocks (ECB-mode). Images usually contain the same pixel combinations (corresponding to data blocks for the encryption process) several times. Using a single key for the image to encrypt, equal plaintext blocks result in equal ciphertext blocks. Thus, even if the image content is well encrypted, the image structure may still be recognizable. Solving this problem by more adequate modes of operation (CBC, CFB, OFB) results in computational overhead which can be avoided, if images are encrypted using a system acting on images as a whole.
. Many attacks on block ciphers are based on accordingly chosen inputs. If the space of possible inputs is exceedingly large (e.g. space of all images of a certain dimension) , it is much harder to find inputs suitable for breaking the system. Finally, under certain conditions detailed later on, all permutation and substitution operations involved in our approach can be implemented using only additions, subtractions and bit-shifts which makes the method several times faster than comparable encryption systems (DES, IDEA).
IMAGE PERMUTATIONS BASED ON CHAOTIC KOLMOGOROV FLOWS
The main task for a permutation operator in the framework of an iterated product cipher is the rearrangement ("scrambling") of elements contained in plaintext blocks in a way such that every ciphertext block has a pseudorandom appearance ( "confusion" ) and similar plaintexts do result in completely different ciphertexts ( "diffusion").
As explained in the last section, our goal is to find key-dependent permutation operations where the actual rearrangement can be determined by a single parameter which acts as the key uniquely specifying the permutation dynamics.
This will be accomplished by means of so-called Kolmogorov flows T,1, a class of extraordinary unstable chaotic systems where each element of the class is characterized by the parameter ri. The reason why we expect Kolmogorov flows to be particularly usefull for scrambling input data blocks is simple: they are the most unstable systems currently known26!
Continuous Kolmogorov flows
To give a notion why the extraordinary unstable dynamics of a chaotic Kolmogorov flow is so especially suitable for implementing key-dependent permutations in the context of a product cipher, consider the example given in Figure 2 where the parameter is set to it = (0.25, 0.5, 0.25). Formally this procedure can be formulated as follows. Let F8 denote the left border of the vertical strip which contains the point (x, y) that is to be transformed. Clearly the following relation holds for F8
Then T : lE -+ E is defined by T(x,y) = ((x_Fs)PsY+Fs) (2) for (x,y) E {F,F5+p8) x [0,1) While one application of T is a rather simple process, iterating T generates very complex behavior, as can be seen from the iterates shown in Figure 2 . Actually there are several important properties which hold for every Kolmogorov flow'2'2'3'22:
Ergodicity: The trajectory connecting the iterates of almost every starting point in E approaches any other point in E arbitrarily close. In cryptographic terms ergodicity means that it is very hard to predict the final position of a point from its initial position (confusion).
Mixing-property: Any measurable subset of E is spread out uniformly across E. In cryptographic terms this implies that any regular structures contained in the input blocks will never pass over to the output block. Instead input regularities dissipate all over the corresponding output (confusion).
Exponential divergence: Neighboring points diverge exponentially in the x-direction. This is a characteristic property of chaotic systems where small variations amplify and change the overall systems behavior in a very complex manner. In cryptographic terms: small modifications in inputs cause huge changes in the corresponding outputs (diffusion).
Summing up Kolmogorov flows do precisely exhibit the properties required for a good permutation operator in the context of product cipher. However, to utilize continuous Kolmogorov flows for permuting blocks of plaintext, discrete counterparts must be found.
Discrete Kolmogorov flows
Given a list of positive integers 5 = (ni , n2, . . . , nk), 0 < n < n and > n = n, a discrete Kolmogorov flow (keyed by 8) for scrambling the data within an n x n image can be defined in a very natural way24 '25'3033 under the mild assumption that all n S partition the side length n.
Let the numbers q8 (s = 1, 2, . . . , k) be specified by q = -. Due to the constraint that n must divide n, all q8 are positive integers and we have the correspondence to the continuous case: q8 -. Additionally N8 shall denote the left border of the vertical strip which contains the point (x, y) that is to be transformed. 
( mod , div . . . see ) constitutes the best possible discrete approximation to the corresponding chaotic continuous transform in the sense that deviations only occur at the least-significant position.
T,5 is a bijective map. The inverse T,' is easily found to be given by
for (x, y) e [0, n ) x [ M8, M3 + ne). In contrast to N8 which marks the left border of the vertical strip s, M8
denotes the lower border of the horizontal strip where the point (x, y) lies in and it can be computed as follows:
M -' For n an integral power of 2 the calculation of T,5 (and also the corresponding inversion formula T, ) can be done by just using additions, subtractions and bit-shift operations which allows for very efficient SW/HW implementations of the permutation and inverse permutation operator, respectively. It is worth mentioning that For cryptographic purposes it is crucial to know how many possible keys do exist for a given encryption system. In the case of permutations by discrete Kolmogorov flows this reduces to the question, how many different valid parameters 6 do exist for a given side-length n. In other words: How many lists of positive integers S = (ni , Th2, • . . , flk) (0 < ni < n) summing up to n can be found under the constraint that every n has to partition n?
As detailed in,16'17'1 a computationally feasible answer to this question can be found by a method based on formal power series expansions leading to a simple recursion formula. If R = { r1 , r2 , . . . , rm } (r1 = 1 , rm < n) denotes the set containing all admissible divisors of the side-length n in ascending order, then c , the number of all lists 6 constituting a valid key for T,8, can be computed using Table 1 . How do these values compare to the key-spaces offered by other systems widely in use today? DES offers S6bit, SKIPJACK (Clipper) provides 80bit and IDEA (PES) has l28bit available. Therefore, as a rough estimate, n = 64 (-+50bit) is close to DES and n = 128 (-+lO3bit) is between SKIPJACK and IDEA. ri. = 256 (-+2O9bit), however, is already something close to the estimated number of particles in the universe and the exponential growth obvious from Table 1 ensures that discrete Kolmogorov flows offer key-spaces that will definitely be sufficient for the foreseeable future.
SUBSTITUTION BASED ON SHIFT REGISTER PRNG
In a product cipher permutations are complemented by substitution operations. This is essential because no permutation in the world can change important statistical properties (e.g. histogram) of the underlying data. Therefore, besides other tasks, the substitution has to ensure that the output of the overall encryption process is always a block of uniformly distributed pseudo-random data regardless of the distribution of data in the input block.
Two popular methods for generating pseudo-random numbers are by either using linear congruential relations19 or linear shift registers.38'14 As emphasized in many papers (e.g.27), randomness in cryptography is different from the ordinary standards of randomness in the sense that, for cryptographic purposes, the matter of predictability is exceedingly important. We take account of this requirement by combining random number generation (substitution) in an intertwined and iterated manner with permutation operations, as proposed by the general framework of a product cipher system.
Shift register based pseudo-random number generation
Our choice for implementing a suitable substitution operator is based on a shift register pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). Given an irreducible polynomial f(x) over GF (2) f (x) = cx + c1x' + ... + c1x + co, (8) it can be shown (e.g.'3) that f(x) induces a PRNG with period 2 -1 if 212 -1 is prime. Since all calculations are performed in GF (2), every c has to be either 0 or 1 and addition is to be understood modulo 2 (exclusive-or operator). The new value x1 (t + 1) for the first cell of the shift register is computed by XORing the actualvalues of all storage elements x (t) wherever the corresponding coefficient c in the generating polynomial f is set . All other x(t + 1) (2 < i < ri) are obtained by simply taking x_1 (t) and the output of the shift register at timet is given by x12(t).
Due to its outstanding efficiency, its very long period and the sufficient statistical properties which have been studied thoroughly, we decided to use an adaption of the PRNG called "R250" introduced in.18'5 As indicated by the name, this generator is based on a shift register of length 250 generated by the irreducible trinomial f(x) = x250 + x103 + 1. (9) Notice that the superb period of 2250 1 does not depend upon the number of bits used in the random number generator. To generate a single random bit, we add the previously calculated 103rd and 250th bit. If we want to generate a random number of 16 or 32 bits, this can be accomplished by doing the above 1 bit addition for each bit in the desired random number independently on all bit-planes in parallel.
Application for substitution purposes
Pseudo-random numbers generated by maximum period linear shift registers pass all standard statistical tests for randomness and, therefore, naturely fulfill the confusion condition required for cryptographic applications. But bit-wise exclusive-or operators also have a disadvantage: changes in one bit-plane do not propagate over onto other bit-planes which is in contradiction with the difusion property essential for a good cipher. To overcome this problem, it is useful to slightly modify the generating recurrence relation specified in the preceding subsection. (11) 
( mod , div . . . see footnote in subsection 2.2.).
According to these formulas, carries propagate to the next higher bit-plane and carries occurring at the rnostignificant level are fed back to the least-significant level. In other words: differences in input data are amplified in an exponential manner which guarantees that also the diffusion property holds for the substitution presented.
Usually this type of substitution is keyed by the initial state of the shift register used instead of the values c[i], p{i] with negative indices. In order to apply this 1D formula to 2D images, the rows of the n x n input image are first concatenated to form an n2 x 1 array which is then processed according to the substitution formula given. As a fine point, the direction of substitution is changed in every other round which will make things harder for differential crypt-analysts and increase security against probable-word analysis. 28 
RESULTS
Since the permutation and the substitution operators in use possess the confusion and diffusion property, it is obvious that so does the overall system. This shall be validated by means of some illustrative examples. To this end, a 12 round implementation operating on byte-images of dimensions 512 x 512 will be used, whereby encryption as well as decryption is keyed by a pass-phrase containing less than 250 characters.
The first experiment which is shown in Figure 4 emphasizes the confusion property of the cipher under consideration.
In the first row on the left side the famous lena image is given together with its histogram. It is then used as input image to the cipher. The corresponding output image is shown on the right hand side of the first row. No similarities can be observed between the input and the output, neither in the image domain, nor in statistical terms. In the second row, left side, a completely black (empty) input image is specified. It contains 512 x 512 = 266.144 zeros while other values different from zero do not occur, as is emphasized by the histogram.
However, even for this degenerated input image the corresponding cipher image is a uniform distribution of pseudo-random values.
The second experiment which is shown in Figure 5 is intended to emphasize the diffusion property of the cipher under consideration with respect to small changes in input data.
In the first row on the very left lena is given once again. Then follows an image very similar to lena which is in fact equal to lena except for one single pixel whose value has been increased by one. Of course these two images have almost equal histograms, so just one of them is given third in the first row. The last pane in the first row shows the correlation of the two input images which is very strong, naturely.
The corresponding output images when encrypting the input images given above with the same pass-phrase are depicted in the second row. On the very left the ciphertext resulting from the encryption of lena is given. Next follows the histogram of the encryption resulting from modified lena. As expected, they are once again pseudo-random uniform distributions. Most important in Figure 5 are panes three and four in the lower row. The third pane shows the difference between the ciphers computed when encrypting lena and modified lena with the same key. Obviously the ciphers show no similarities at all and there is no significant correlation that could be observed from the correlation plot shown in the very right pane of the second row.
The final experiment given in Figure 6 is intended to emphasize the diffusion property of the cipher under consideration with respect to small changes in pass-phrases. This is important because otherwise an intruder might reconstruct parts of the input image from the observed output image by a partly correct guess of the pass-phrase used for the encryption operation.
This figure is to be read column-wise. The first column gives the original lena image together with the histogram. In the second column the cipher image is depicted when lena is encrypted using the pass-phrase "Max Maier, 0732-2468/9828" (warning: it is no good habit to use name and telephone number as a pass-phrase!). Finally in the third column there is the result when attempting to decrypt with the almost correct guess "Max Maier, O732-568/9828". The conclusion to be drawn from this attempt is that even an almost perfect guess of The experiments given are just a small selection out of the tests performed to validate some important properties of the cipher introduced. Note that the arguments given for confusion and diffusion in the corresponding sections are not limited to any specific pass-phrases or input images. Therefore, it can be expected that these properties hold for arbitrary combinations of pass-phrases and input data. A larger set of experiments conducted to check the pseudo-random nature of cipher images including results from standard statistical tests (AC-test, S-test, R-test, M-test) can be found in. 30 
CONCLUSION
Deducing from analytical investigations supported by experimental validation, the cipher introduced in this paper can be characterized by the following properties:
• Security:
-confusion and diffusion property on input images is fulfilled -even an almost perfect guess of pass-phrase does not reveal any information about the input image -key space is much larger than for any comparable system currently in use -differential cryptanalysis does not make sense (key-dependent permutation, substitution changes direction in every other round, very large input blocks)
• Implementation:
-flexibility in implementation and extension; modularity makes it easily adaptable to new needs implied by technological progress or additional crypt-analytical insights -encryption and decryption have the same complexity -only additions, subtractions and bit-shifts involved -efficient 11W and SW implementations possible -SW prototype proved to be several times faster than corresponding DES and IDEA implementations No cipher can be considered secure unless it has undergone severe scrutiny. However, from the current perspective it does not seem likely that any short-cuts or other weaknesses will be found. Therefore, it can be expected that the system proposed in this paper should be of considerable interest in image encryption applications where an appropriate combination of efficiency and security plays a major role.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) under grant S7001MAT.
